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Abstract
Most real life systems have a random component: the multitude of endogenous and exogenous
factors influencing them result in stochastic fluctuations of the parameters determining their dy-
namics. These empirical systems are in many cases subject to noise of multiplicative nature. The
special properties of multiplicative noise as opposed to additive noise have been noticed for a long
while. Even though apparently and formally the difference between free additive vs. multiplicative
random walks consists in just a move from normal to log-normal distributions, in practice the im-
plications are much more far reaching. While in an additive context the emergence and survival of
cooperation requires special conditions (especially some level of reward, punishment, reciprocity),
we find that in the multiplicative random context the emergence of cooperation is much more
natural and effective. We study the various implications of this observation and its applications in
various contexts.
PACS numbers: 89.20.-a Interdisciplinary applications of physics , 89.65.-s Social and economic systems ,
89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, business and management , 89.75.Fb Structures and
organization in complex systems
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I. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE
One of the puzzling facts in game theory is the recurring result, in a wide range of
conditions that the general good is not reached by each of the individuals following its
own self interest. Technically it means that in most of the games considered, the “Nash
Equilibrium” is not an optimal situation for the ensemble of players taking part in the game
[1]. Another name for this kind of situation is “the tragedy of the commons” [2]: if a set of
players have access to a common good, and each of them will act only in his own interest,
the common good is going to be over-exploited and ultimately lost/destroyed. The puzzle
resides in the fact that the very existence of our society, human civilization and many animal
societies is based on a much higher level of cooperation than suggested by the above models.
The loopholes in the arguments leading to those pessimistic conclusions have been looked
for at length and in certain cases some mechanisms to avoid this “mean fate” were found.
For example, allowing for an infinitely long chain of iterated games might affect the non-
cooperative result [1]. Five more mechanisms to ensure that cooperative traits will survive
evolution in additive environments can be found here [3].
In the present paper we offer another alternative: we find that if the gains and losses of
the participants are multiplicative, then the cooperative behavior becomes highly preferable
and might in fact be realized in a very wide range of realistic examples. The fundamental
feature of multiplicative process we exploit here is the fact that the expected gain of the
players taking part in this iterative process depends in a crucial way on the number of
players considered (number of independent realizations) and the number of time steps that
the game is played. For long times (the number of time steps played in the game), the
expected wealth of the players follows the geometric mean and not the arithmetic mean of
the game (keep in mind that “geometric mean ≤ arithmetical mean”).
In economics, one way to take into account this effect was to declare that what is to be
maximized is not the wealth itself but rather the “utility function” [4]. The case where the
“utility function“ is the logarithm of the wealth U =
∑
e p(e) ln(g(e)) reduces to considering
the geometric mean rather than the arithmetic mean. Thus, the use of this utility function
may be interpreted as a way to take into account the fact that in general a strategy is ap-
plied repeatedly for long spans of time such that the frequency of the events approach their
probability. Some of the behavioral anomalies studied over the years [5–7] can be related to
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the subtle difference between the expectation for one game and the probability for longer
series of events. Moreover, the asymmetry between losing and gaining proposed by the
prospect theory [6] and the particularities of how people evaluate very improbable events
get more legitimacy from the above analysis (and the one below). The present analysis
is mathematically congenial with re-balancing strategies [8] in financial portfolio manage-
ment. Indeed, one finds there a multiplicative random process (the fluctuations of the equity
prices) coupled with a redistribution of the portfolio wealth between the various equities.
As in the case of individuals cooperating, the re-balancing of the investments between the
various portfolio instruments leads to very crucial optimization [9]. The difference is that
the portfolio instruments do not have a conscience or personal interests, or the capability to
decide by their own what is to happen with the money invested in them. Thus the formal
game is quite different: in the present article we ask whether cooperation serves better the
selfish interests of the living individual while in the portfolio problem one asks what is the
strategy for optimizing the total wealth. It is a nontrivial result of the present paper that
in a wide range of conditions the two coincide. This is again a nontrivial consequence of
the multiplicative dynamics: in usual additive gain/loss games one ends up in a globally
non-optimize Nash equilibrium. The attitude suggested by the analysis that follows is of
ignoring events that never happen. It affects crucially the recommended level of sharing in
very risky environments [9, 10].
In situations that we will study below, this makes a difference of life and death: systems
that ”theoretically” are expected to flourish (arithmetic mean exceeds 1) may in reality
be doomed to extinction (geometric mean is below 1). In order to restore the efficient
“expected“ result, one has to make recourse to extreme forms of sharing that might be
difficult to discriminate behaviorally from pure altruism.
II. THE PROPOSED DYNAMICS
A. The generic setup
First, in order to emphasize the particularities of the multiplicative random processes, let
us evaluate the expected gain F (T ) of a multiplicative random process up to time T . F (T )
is by definition the sum over all possible histories H of duration T of the probability of each
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history P (H) times the gain G(H) associated with that history: F (T ) =
∑
H P (H) ·G(H).
Each history probability P (H) is the product of the probabilities p(eH(t)) of its events
eH(t), t ∈ {1, ...T}: P (H) =
∏
t p(eH(t)) and the history’s gain is, in a multiplicative process,
the product of the gains G(H) =
∏
t g(eH(t)) associated with the events. Thus F (T ) can be
expressed also as:
F (T ) = [
∑
e
p(e) · g(e)]T (1)
However, for large times (T ) the only histories H appearing with finite probability P (H)
are the ones where each event occurs a number of times T · p(e), proportional to its prob-
ability p(e). Thus, the expected gain instead of being the T power of the arithmetic mean
[
∑
e p(e)g(e)]
T reduces to
∏
e g(e)
p(e)·T i.e. the geometric mean to the power T :
∏
e
g(e)T ·p(e) = [
∏
e
g(e)p(e)]T = eT ·
∑
e p(e) ln(g(e)) (2)
Next, we propose a simple dynamic setup that will allow us to study further the possible
implications of this basic feature of multiplicative dynamics. We consider the following
individual iterative process: each player puts all of his/her accumulated wealth Wi(t) at
stake :
Wi(t+ 1) =


a ·Wi(t) with probability p
b ·Wi(t) with probability q = 1− p

 (3)
where (0 < b < a). As was mentioned before, if one takes first the limit of t −→ ∞,
then the expected wealth of any finite number of independent realizations, R, will follow
the geometric mean (Mg), i.e. for t 6≪ log(R) (see appendix A for the derivation of this
condition)
< Wi(t) >i=< Wi(0) >i ·(Mg)
t (4)
where Mg ≡ a
pbq = ep·log(a)+q·log(b) and the average is done over the R realizations. While
for any finite time if one takes enough independent realizations then the expected wealth
will follow the arithmetic mean (Ma), i.e. when R≫ e
t then
< Wi(t) >i=< Wi(0) >i ·(Ma)
t (5)
where Ma ≡ p · a + q · b. Since it is always true that Ma ≥ Mg, it turns out that the na¨ıve
(arithmetic) expectation is always deceiving by making the game seemingly more gainful
than it actually is. In the cases where Ma ≥ 1 ≥ Mg it becomes a matter of life and death
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as the arithmetic mean predicts growth while the reality follows the geometric mean which
predicts decay.
Hereby, we show that there exists a better way to restore the optimistic expectation value
(Ma): it is enough that a small group of individuals share continuously their total wealth
to ensure the optimistic expectation value of the game without the need for exponentially
large number of realizations.
More specifically, if N players are sharing their gains after each game, the evolution of
their wealth will be governed by stochastic process which updates Wi(t) (uniformly to all
players) as:
Wi(t+ 1) = [a ·
k
N
+ b ·
N − k
N
] ·Wi(t), k ∈ {0...N} (6)
with probability

 N
k

 pkqN−k . Here k is the number of ”wins” (a’s) the N individuals
achieve during the time t. For large enough times (t 6≪ log(R)) this leads according to
equation 2 (Figure 1) to the expected growth rate of:
rN =
N∑
k=0

 N
k

 pkqN−k · ln(a · k
N
+ b ·
N − k
N
) (7)
where rN is the exponential growth rate of the new game which is composed of N sharing
individuals: i.e. the logarithm of the geometrical mean of the new setup (where the individ-
uals are sharing). Since for large N −→∞ the only relevant contribution to this sum comes
from k = p · N and the prefactor of the logarithm sums to one (since it is a probability
function) one may conclude that:
r∞ = ln(p · a+ q · b) = ln(Ma) (8)
According to the central limit theorem, for large N , the variance in the fluctuations of the
growth rate around rN depends on N as DN = D/N where D is of order 1 and depends on
the parameters (p, a, b). On the other hand, according to the Ito calculus the multiplicative
process of the type: V (t + 1) = eη · V (t) where η is a Gaussian variable with an average of
rN and variance of DN has an average growth rate equal to rN +DN/2. Combining these
two observations with the knowledge of r∞ leads to:
rN +D/(2N)
−→
N→∞ r∞ = log (p · a+ q · b) (9)
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FIG. 1: The main plot represents the average growth rate rN as a function of N the number of
sharing individuals (according to equation 7). The parameters are (p = q = 0.5, a = 2, b = 1/3) i.e.
at each time step one can double ones wealth or loose two thirds of it with equal chances. With
these parameters, the geometric mean is less than one (
√
2
3) while the arithmetic mean is larger
than one (76). One sees that the curve rN crosses 0 between N = 2 and N = 3 which corresponds
to Ncrit = 3. This means that in order to survive, the individuals have to share with at least
two other individuals. The dashed line close to the bottom of the figure is ln(2/3)/2 the value
of the logarithm of the geometrical mean of a and b while the dotted line close to the top of the
figure is the value of the logarithm of the arithmetic mean ln(7/6)). In the inset, one sees how rN
approaches the value of the logarithm of the arithmetic mean ln(7/6) as N increases. It shows that
rN approaches the value 7/6 asymptotically as 1/N (dashed line corresponds to 1/N dependency).
and allows one to evaluate the asymptotic dependence of rN on N :
rN ∼ log (p · a+ q · b)−D/(2N) (10)
This result is indeed validated by the numerical evaluation of eq. 7 as seen in Figure 1
B. Specific example
In the case where b 6= 0 and Ma > 1 the decay can be avoided completely and forever. In
order to build further the intuition for the generic case (b 6= 0) let us substitute the numbers
p = q = 0.5, a = 2 and b = 1/3 in the general process defined by equation 3. Here we have:
Ma ≡ 7/6 > 1 > Mg ≡ (2/3)
(1/2) For these parameters according to equation 7, r2 < 0 < r3
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and thus Ncrit = 3 . When a group consist of N = Ncrit individuals, every and each one
of these individuals cannot afford to defect since then the rest of the population will decay
and even if the others would keep sharing with him/her, the entire system will eventually
collapse, including the defector. One could argue that this argument holds only in cases
where N = Ncrit and when N > Ncrit one can still decide to defect and do better than the
rest. Our answer to this argument may sound similar to group selection arguments but with
a slight change: we have showed that the asymptotic growth rate is an increasing function
of N . Hence, on average, each of the individuals in a group with N individuals with one
defector will have the effective growth rate of individuals in a group with N − 1 individuals.
In principal, if this rate is still positive, one may be tempted to defect, but in practice, if
this group is part of a larger population, each of the individuals will do worse (on average)
than other individuals from other groups with N sharing individuals. Thus if one introduces
competition for limited resources, having a lower growth rate means having a lower chance
to survive, even if the competition is still on an individual level. Thus the sharing behavior
is stable against defection in so far as it is in the interest of each of the individuals not to
defect. See Figure 1 for plots of the numeric solutions for these parameters and Figure 2 for
the validation of these solutions with stochastic simulations.
III. THE KELLY TERMINOLOGY
As seen above, high risk, high gain potential processes generate a paradox: the naive ex-
pected wealth grows asymptotically to infinity while the probability for non-vanishing wealth
(the survival probability) decreases exponentially. To overcome this puzzle, J. Kelly,[12] ini-
tiated an approach that led to a vast literature [10, 13–21] that tested, extended and applied
practically his proposal. The mathematical setting that Kelly considered was the following.
Each individual plays an iterated chance game where at each time step t the player might
loose his/her (whole) wealth with probability q or gain a fraction d of it with probability
p = 1 − q. The player can decide which fraction f of his current wealth Wi(t) to stake.
According to these rules, at the end of the time step t, the player’s wealth will become
Wi(t+ 1) =


(1 + fd)Wi(t)with prob.p
(1− f)Wi(t)with prob.q = 1− p

 (11)
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FIG. 2: Comparison between a set of 16 non-sharing individuals and the same individuals sharing
in groups of various sizes (8 groups of 2, 4 groups of 4 ... etc). All individuals can double at
each time step their wealth or loose 2/3 of it with equal probabilities (same as in figure 1). Then
they share equally the wealth with the partners in their group. One sees that modulo the noise
(and some logarithmic corrections), the growth rates approach respectively the theoretical slopes
(dashed lines in the figure) corresponding to their respective groupings r1, r2, r4... etc (according
equation 7). In order to compare the different results of the groups in a ”fair” way, we used the
same random numbers for the same individual in the different experiments. The difference was
that for the non-sharing individuals we averaged over the 16 independent realizations of W (t) while
for groups of size 2 we averaged over the W (t)’s of the 8 sharing pairs, and so on. Note that not
only the slopes but also the standard deviations are different (due to the non-self averaging feature
[11] of such systems).
Kelly claimed that for asymptotic times and fixed f the individual wealth behaves like
Wi(t) ∼ e
t[p·ln(1+f ·d)+q·ln(1−f)] (which is equivalent to our notation of (Mg)
t). Thus, he con-
cluded that the quantity to be maximized is:
r = [p · ln(1 + fd) + q · ln(1− f)] (12)
which leads to an optimal value for f , f1 ≡
(pd−q)
d
. Note that for each choice of f the Kelly
setup can be connected to the multiplicative random walk formulation by substituting in 3:
a = (1+ fd) and b = (1− f). In these terms, the Kelly criterion is an expression of the fact
that for large enough times, the actual behavior of one individual wealth is determined by
r1 as explained in equation 4. Thus the Kelly criterion is indeed relevant to our problem: it
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finds the f value that maximizes r1. One may combine the Kelly prudence f 6= 1 strategy
with the sharing strategy leading to equation 7 in order to further optimize performance
as we show below. Thus in the light of the previous section results one can address a
fundamental subject that the Kelly criterion raises: In real life, one often does not know
for sure what game he/she is playing or if the game is not changing in time. Therefore one
is not sure which Kelly strategy (f) to choose: in case the f that had been chosen gives
negative r1 for the actual game played (”the reality”) one is in danger to go bankrupt. The
way to cope with this high level of uncertainty is to share: If a group of N individuals decide
to share their wealth and redistribute it at each time step, then they will have more chances
to have positive rN for a wider range of different games ((p, d, f)). More precisely, not only
that the long run expected gain increases with the size of the group but also the domain
where rN is negative:
rN =
N∑
k=0

 N
k

 pkqN−k ln((1 + df) k
N
+ (1− f)
N − k
N
) < 0 (13)
shrinks significantly. For N of order 10 (and p = 0.55, d = 1), the region of ”dangerous“ f ’s
shrinks from 0.8 (out of 1) to 10−20 !! (Figure 3,inset C). This fact allows the player not
only to win more asymptotically, but also to shrink significantly the risk one takes! These
results are presented in Figure 3.
IV. EFFECTS OF ASYNCHRONOUS UPDATING: INFINITE SURVIVAL TIME
FOR GAMES WITH TOTAL LOSS
When the system has some kind of external clock one may treat it in a synchronous
fashion: i.e. all agents update their endowments in the same instance. In many other
systems the individuals are not updated simultaneously but rather asynchronously. The
theoretical framework presented so far applies well to asynchronous systems as well. For
instance consider N individuals with wealths wi; i = 1, ..., N who are forced to play each in
his turn the following multiplicative random game: We assume that the time advances in
units of 1
N
. Every time unit we choose an agent i randomly and update its wealth according
to:
Wi(t+
1
N
) =


a ·Wi(t) with prob. p
b ·Wi(t) with prob. q (b < 1)

 (14)
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FIG. 3: The curves in the main figure represent rN (N = 1, 2, ...) (according equation 13) as a
function of fKelly (the gambled fraction, f of one’s current wealth) for a game with d = 1 (i.e.
getting 2$ on each 1$) and p = 0.55. One sees how the range of f where rN is negative shrinks
extremely fast as a function of N . Thus, for large enough N sharing individuals, almost any f is
safe even if one does not know the parameters of the game (d and p). Inset C shows the boundary
of the safe f region as N increases, Inset A shows the position of the optimal f as a function of
N . Inset B shows that the maximum of rN (equation 13) increases as N grows: the optimal Kelly
strategy for N sharing players improves with N .
Before and after each such step, the total wealth is redistributed equally between all N
individuals. Thus W (t) follows dynamics where only a fraction 1
N
is at stake in the game
while a fraction N−1
N
is passive:
W (t+
1
N
) =


( 1
N
a + N−1
N
) ·W (t) with prob. p
( 1
N
b+ N−1
N
) ·W (t) with prob. q

 (15)
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This representation reduces to the Kelly dynamics, of one player described by equation 11
with f = 1−b
N
and d = a−1
1−b
. Thus the growth (/decay) rate of this process is cf. 12
rasyncN =< N ln(
W (t+1/N)
W (t)
) >=
= N [p · ln(1 + a−1
N
) + q · ln(1− 1−b
N
)]
(16)
where we took into account that the time interval between two individuals updating is 1
N
rather then 1 which was the time for updating all the N individuals. Note that for N −→∞
one gets: rasync∞ = p · a + q · b − 1 which is larger then the ideal synchronous result implied
by equation 5: rideal = ln(Ma) that seemed to be the maximum that one can aspire to.
The various values for asynchronous processes with a = 3, b = 0, p = q = 1/2, N = 2, 4, 20
are shown in figure 4. One sees that already for N = 2 one avoids decay (r2 = 0). See
inset in figure 4 for the non-sharing result with N = 109: in the presented realization, all
the billion non-sharing individuals die after 32 steps !! For N = 20 sharing, synchronous
individuals one gets close to the ideal average rideal = ln(
3
2
) (modulo disastrous collapses
after about 220 ∼ 106 steps which is not seen for runs of order T = 1000 as in figure 4).
Asynchronous N = 20 sharing individuals exceed the na¨ıve average rate (ln(3
2
)) and equals
rasync20 = 10[ln(1.1) + ln(0.95)] (figure 4).
V. FIXED GROUP SIZE AND VARIED GENEROSITY.
Let us now fix the group size N and look at the asymptotic growth rate. In particular,
we look at the case in which after each timestep one is donating to the other members of the
group a fraction 0 ≥ D ≥ 1 of the difference between one’s wealth and the average wealth of
the group. In this way the accumulated wealth of the group is unharmed after this sharing
step.
What we see is that the asymptotic growth rate approaches the calculated value forD = 1
(absolute redistribution) pretty quickly (inset in fig. 5). As one can see in the inset, the
rate in which the asymptotic growth rate approaches the D = 1 value changes with the
group size N , the bigger it is the less one needs to donate in order to get closer to the D = 1
value (this is on top of the fact that the D = 1 value grows as N grows).
If one is interested in a certain value that the asymptotic growth rate passes (for example
0, which distinguishes between growth and decay), it turns out that as the critical value for
12
D, Dcross scales like 1/N for large N ’s (figure 6) which means that as group size increases
one has to share less in order to achieve growth rates which are close to the D = 1 value.
VI. DISCUSSION
Altruism elicits in humans very powerful and diverse feelings. Its paradoxical nature
makes it mysterious and challenging to understand. In fact, often one looks for hidden ulte-
rior motives that would offer alternative explanations for an ostensibly altruistic behavior.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand why a rational being would sacrifice its own interests or
existence for somebody else. At the biological level, it is difficult to understand how a gene
that is not selfish would be able to survive and procreate. In a world of scarce resources,
forfeiting one’s own means for the benefit of another seems synonym with suicide. Thus
one often recurs for an explanation to assuming either kinship or some kind of reciprocity.
Reciprocity that cannot be enforced seems to be ruled out: whether one is granted a ”gift”
from the other players or not, the formal game-theory optimal reaction is selfishness. Most
of the mechanisms that could lead to altruism are marred by the ”free riders” problem. We
trace the origin for the current direction the scientific discussion about altruism is taking to
the fact that the vast majority of models considered in the literature[3, 22] have an additive
reward mechanism. While additive rewards exist in nature in some cases, multiplicative
processes are as important and present in many biological and economic systems in various
contexts. We have showed that in quite realistic conditions (multiplicative reward mecha-
nism) the very selfish interest of individuals to survive and prosper leads them rationally
to an altruist-like behavior. More precisely, it follows from the rules of the game that by
granting unconditionally to others part of one’s own resources, individuals prolong their own
survival expectation and increase their “wealth” expectation. In an additive environment
the maximum that could be obtained was the prevalence of tit-for-tat-like [22, 23] behavior
that is significantly less then unconditional cooperation. For infinite or indefinite game dura-
tions the emergence of cooperation has been obtained within the usual probabilistic / game
theory formalism. However, we find that in multiplicative environments (which we believe
are the more common scenarios present in the real world), the cooperation is justified and
in fact unavoidable even for series with a quite limited number of iterated games. As seen
in figure 1, the difference between cooperation and defection may be the difference between
13
immediate extinction to unlimited growth. More research about the exact conditions in
which altruism is preferred (and to what level) in multiplicative random environments is
still needed and the results may depend on the specific details of the system such as: what
is the exact sharing mechanism? what fraction of all resources that were intended to be
shared reach their target and what gets lost along the way? with whom does the group of
sharing individuals compete? what exactly is the selection mechanism, etc. However, we
may now start to understand why the present surviving species appear to contain altruistic
genes: The genes are still selfish but the phenotype behaves ostensibly altruistic.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied some aspects of the emergence, efficiency and consequences of cooper-
ation in systems with multiplicative gains and losses. We have found that as opposed to
games with additive gains and losses, in a risky multiplicative environment unconditional
cooperation is quite a normal outcome. This conclusion is robustly resilient even when one
relaxes and extends the conditions and the rules of the game in various directions. While
certain mathematical properties of multiplicative random walks [12, 24–26] underlying our
analysis have been known for a while (especially in the context of wealth redistribution be-
tween portfolio items for portfolio optimization by the portfolio owner) the application to
independent rational individuals each of which decides independently on the basis of self-
interest has not been discussed before. The present article is only a modest beginning in a
quite wide range of possible research works to explore the rich and unexpected properties
of such a multiplicative games theory. In particular, the multiplicative property implies the
coupling of the gains in the future to the ones in the past which is an element absent in
the additive game theory and had to be substituted through the introduction of memory
and ”moral” related behavior and additional concepts: reward, punishment, etc. Obviously,
when the empirical system follows an additive dynamics, one is to study it through additive
rewards games. There are plenty of examples for real life systems that do not fall into this
category and where the rewards are of multiplicative nature. We hope that in these cases
people will start to study these systems with the appropriate underlying dynamics and will
apply the results presented here (and the ones to follow) to them.
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Appendix A: Average behavior vs. typical one
Let us show why the restoration of the arithmetic means requires exponential number
of realizations: to start with, we concentrate on the case where: a ≥ 1 ≥ b ≥ 0 and
Ma > 1 > Mg > 0 The condition that a realization has a positive cumulative growth factor
W (t)
W (0)
= an · bt−n > 1 (A.1)
is that the number of “wins” (n) will be
n > αt (A.2)
where α = 1/(1− ln(a)
ln(b)
).
Given the Gaussian approximation of the Poisson probability of n ”wins” (Figure 7):
Prob(n, t) = (2pitpq)−1/2e−(n−tp)
2/2tpq (A.3)
one can compute the fraction of realizations of duration t for which the cumulative wealth
grows W (t)/W (0) > 1: ∫ t
n=αt
(2pitpq)−1/2e−(n−tp)
2/2tpqdn (A.4)
It turns out that for Mg < 1, the integral is very well approximated by its largest integrand
e−(αt−tp)
2/2tpq. Thus the measure of the increasing W (t) histories decays to 0 as:
Prob(W (t)/W (0) > 1) ∼ e
−t{1/(1− ln(a)
ln(b)
)−p}2/2pq
(A.5)
Which means that in order to have any chance to obtain a result for which W (t) increases
at all one needs a number of realizations diverging exponentially with f(a, b, p) · t. For t
time steps:
R ∼ et{1/(1−
ln(a)
ln(b)
)−p}2/2pq (A.6)
For any finite sample R, the actual behavior in most cases will be decay. One can replace
equation A.1 with a more general condition which requires contributions larger than the
arithmetic mean:
W (t)
W (0)
= an · bt−n > M ta (A.7)
which yields
R ∼ et{
ln(Ma/b)
ln(a/b)
−p}2/2pq (A.8)
15
that generally means that the number of realizations needed to restore the (arithmetic)
average of a game grows exponentially in t - the rate of convergence of the exponential
dependency in t is a function of the parameters of the game (a, b, p):
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FIG. 4: The evolution of W (t) for synchronous and asynchronous updated sets of sharing indi-
viduals. The scale is semi-logarithmic meaning that straight lines correspond to exponential. All
series fit well the straight line with the theoretically predicted slope. In principle the synchronous
run should collapse suddenly and irreversibly to W (t) = 0 when by chance all individuals have
bad luck (loose all their current individual wealth) at the same time step. However this very im-
probable event is expected only around times of order 220 which are beyond the size of the runs
shown in the figure (T = 1000). Compare this with the case of non-sharing individuals in the
inset where even for N = 109 the collapse takes place after only ln(109) ∼ 20 steps! The (red)
circles in the inset represent the number of N(t) individuals with Wi(t) 0 (in fact all the Wi(t)
which are not zero are 3t, the corresponded scale is the right one). The (black) triangles represent
the average W (t) = N(t)/N(0)3t. Note that N(t) decays as 2−t and thus W (t) ∼ (3/2)t until
N(t) = 0 when w(t) collapses to 0 too! The life time of this process is exceedingly short: in the
presented realization, even for N(0) = 109, W (33) = 0. Returning to the main plot, the diamonds
correspond to a N = 20 asynchronous sharing individuals. The slope fits well the straight line
with the theoretical value of the slope r = 10 · ln(1.045), which is clearly above the maximal value
allowed for synchronous dynamics r = ln(3/2) but below the line with asymptotic N = ∞ slope
r = 1/2.
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FIG. 5: Same parameters as in figures 1 and 2 (and also in figure 6, p = q = 0.5, a = 2 and
b = 1/3). In this plot we show how the asymptotic growth rate of a group of N = 3 cooperative
individuals approaches the calculated value for D = 1 (strait dashed line). In the inset the value
of D = 1 minus the asymptotic growth rate (normalized to the value of D = 0) is plotted on a
logarithmic scale for different group sizes. One sees how it approaches the D = 1 value: the growth
rate approaches the D = 1 value faster as the group size increases.
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FIG. 6: Same parameters as in figures 1 and 2 and 5. The value of D that makes the the growth
rate of N cooperative individuals positive (Dcrit), on a log-log scale. One sees that asymptotically,
it seems to scale like 1/N
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FIG. 7: The contribution of the various types of processes to W (T ) as a function of the fraction
of “wins” n/T . We took T = 100, a = 2, b = 1/3, p = q = 1/2 as an example. The curves
represent respectively: − the dashed line is the value of W (T = 100) for n wins and 100−n losses:
2n3n−100. − the dotted line is the probability for n wins and 100 − n losses: C(100, n)/2100 . −
the full line is the total contribution to < W (T ) > of processes with n wins and 100 − n losses:
C(100, n)/2100 · 2n3n−100. On the logarithmic scale (inset) the situation seems simple: the first
curve is a straight line, the second is a parabola and the third is their sum: a parabola with shifted
maximum. However, on the normal graph (the axes are rescaled to facilitate view) the root of
the various paradoxes becomes apparent: the first 2 graphs (dashed and dotted) are concentrated
in narrow respectively disjoint regions: the region where the large values of W are concentrated
have negligible probability. Thus their product (full line) has a spurious maximum in a region
that is practically unreachable in the physical reality. The relevant values in reality are the ones
which take into account only the region around the peak of the dotted line at n = 50 where the
contribution to the value of W (T ) is (23)
50.
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